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"I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must
legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are
confined from molar to molecular motions."
Oliver Wendell Holmes'
I. PREFACE
The ancient common tort of public nuisance is one of the most
highly visible issues in modem tort jurisprudence. Its growth is
particularly notable in climate change and environmental litigation, where
it seems to be the "tort of choice" for plaintiffs seeking breathtakingly
broad relief from global warming and trans-border pollution.2
Traditionally limited to local concerns, the tort now aspires to global
dimensions, and its expanding scope seems increasingly likely to attract
review by the United States Supreme Court. 3 If its advocates succeed, the
1 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 201 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (Yale Univ. Press
1921) (stating that courts make law only within the "gaps" and "open spaces of the law").
2 See generally Richard 0. Faulk & John S. Gray, Premature Burial? The Resuscitation
ofPublic Nuisance Litigation, 24 Toxics L. REPT. (BNA) 1231 (Oct. 22, 2009)
(analyzing recent public nuisance decisions regarding climate change). See also Richard
0. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom? The Transmutation ofPublic
Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941 (2007); Donald G. Gifford, Public
Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741 (2003) (providing
historical perspectives regarding public nuisance).
3 The Second Circuit recently denied rehearing en banc in a case allowing public
nuisance claims to proceed based upon defendants' greenhouse gas contributions to
global warming under federal common law, and the defendants filed a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court on Aug. 2, 2010. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power
Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). A Fifth Circuit panel rendered a similar decision
allowing claims to proceed under Mississippi law, but the ruling was vacated and the
appeal dismissed when the court granted rehearing en banc and subsequently discovered
it lacked the necessary quorum to hear the case. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585
F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), reh'g granted, 598 F.3d 208 (2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d
1049 (2010). Under Fifth Circuit law, a vacated panel decision has no value as
precedent, but the court noted that the plaintiffs may still seek certiorari. See Comer, 607
F.3d at 1053-55. Another global warming case, which was recently dismissed, is now
pending in the Ninth Circuit. See Native Village ofKivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.
Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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"monster that will devour in one gulp the entire law of torts" 4 may be
afforded a prime seat at the banquet.
This enthusiasm should be tempered, however, by caution -
caution advised by wise common law jurists who warned against abrupt
shifts in societal norms through judicial action alone. Although the
"common law" may have originated within the judiciary, citizens have
increasingly imposed legislative and regulatory policies to guide and
regulate its discretion. These began as early as the Magna Carta,
proceeded through the industrial revolution, and matured into today's
complex legislative and regulatory environment.5  In today's legal
landscape, where conduct and business activities are thoroughly regulated
by statutes and administrative rules, there are comparatively few areas
where a common law court is free to act without legislative influence. 6
Moreover, even when the political branches have not acted in an
area, common law courts are not necessarily free to fill the void. As we
will see below, some controversies - even when framed as "ordinary"
public nuisance lawsuits - involve issues where courts lack the tools and
resources to reach results that are principled, rational, and based on
reasoned distinctions. When such non-justiciable political questions are
raised, courts wisely defer to the political branches of government, which
are far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate vast
amounts of data bearing upon complex and dynamic issues. Thus,
irrespective of whether the executive or legislative branches have spoken,
due respect for their constitutional responsibilities - combined with
awareness of the judiciary's own limitations - can motivate judicial
restraint. Although the ancients concluded that "nature abhors a
4 See In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 505 (N.J. 2007) (holding that, if public
nuisance law expanded beyond its traditional boundaries, it "would become a monster
that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort.") (quoting Camden County Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, USA Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3rd Cir. 2001)).
See generally Faulk & Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom?, supra note 2, at 951-60.
6 See Arthur T. Von Mehren, Some Reflections on Codification and Case Law in the
Twenty-First Century, 31 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 659, 660 (1997) ("Codification and case
law embody two contrasting, yet complimentary, principles ofjustice.... In every legal
system, regardless of where it falls on the spectrum between a pure system of codified
law and a pure system of case law, the principles of these two approaches are in
tension.").
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vacuum,"7 there are circumstances in the law where uncharted voids
should be eschewed.
II. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW
Over the last century, common law and statutory codification
systems began to converge. To some extent, codified systems departed
from their rigidity and became more fact-specific in their approaches, and
common law systems increasingly stressed the advantages and importance
of "structure, coherence, and predictability" in judicial administration.8
As early as 1908, Roscoe Pound was convinced that judges should take a
more responsive attitude toward legislation.9 Pound demonstrated that
antiquated ideas, such as the principle that "statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed," were inappropriate; instead, he
advised that courts should refer to the principles set forth by legislators
when applying the common law.' 0 As he stated:
Courts are fond of saying that they apply old principles to
new situations. But at times they must apply new
principles to situations both old and new. The new
principles are in legislation. The old principles are in
common law. The former are as much to be respected and
made effective as the latter - probably more so as our
legislation improves."
7 This supposition is often attributed to Aristotle. See generally PATRICK J. HURLEY, A
CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 551-52 (10th ed. 2008). The belief persisted for
centuries until certain fallacies were demonstrated by the experiments of Galileo and
Torricelli. Id. at 552. Nevertheless, the saying perhaps offers wisdom for public
nuisance cases. As Thoreau observed, "Nature abhors a vacuum, and if I can only walk
with sufficient carelessness, I am sure to be filled." HENRY DAVID THOREAU, EARLY
SPRING IN MASSACHUSETTS 34-35 (Boston Houghton 1892). In the absence of guiding
principles, errors are as likely to fill the jurisprudential mind as wisdom.
Von Mehren, supra note 6, at 667.
Roscoe Pound, Common Law andLegislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 383 (1908)
(noting with disdain, even at that early date, the "indifference, if not contempt, with
which [legislation] is being regarded by courts and lawyers.").
'0 Id. at 401-02, 406-07.
" Id. at 406-07.
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Justice Harlan Stone demonstrated the continuity of this view in 1936
when he concluded: "I can find in the history and principles of the
common law no adequate reason for our failure to treat a statute much
more as we treat a judicial precedent, as both a declaration and source of
law, and as a premise for legal reasoning."l2
Historically, legislative and regulatory enactments informed and
guided the judiciary in the context of property rights, especially those
involving expectations that landlords should be responsible for
maintaining property in a healthy condition. For example, Justice Cardozo
stressed the importance of legislative policies, such as housing codes.
Although the common law imposed no duty to repair and required tenants
to pay rent even when housing was unsuitable, the widespread adoption of
housing codes led courts to discard those principles.' 3 In one of the first
cases to do so, Judge Cardozo held that the code "changed the measure of
[the landlord's] burden," and used the statute to guide his decision
regarding whether to reform a common law doctrine.14 Other common
law developments regarding the duties owed by landlords to tenants
adopted the same approach. For example, in allowing tenants to sue
landlords for injuries caused by defective premises, Judge Bazelon
recognized that legislatively established duties reflect contemporary
community values and that "the law of torts can only be out ofjoint with
community standards if it ignores the existence of such duties."'
12 Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 13-14
(1936) ("Apart from its command, the social policy and judgment, expressed in
legislation by the lawmaking agency which is supreme, would seem to merit that judicial
recognition which is freely accorded to the like expression in judicial precedent.").
' See, e.g., Altz v. Leiberson, 134 N.E. 703, 703 (N.Y. 1922).
14 id.
15 Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960); see also Pines
v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (Wis. 1961) ("The legislature has made a policy
judgment - that it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a
property owner - which has rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To follow the
old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be
inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing standards."); Boston
Hous. Auth. v. Hemmingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Mass. 1973) ("Thus, we are
confronted with a situation where the legislation's establishment of policy carries
significance beyond the particular scope of each of the statutes involved.").
5
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Today, scholars recognize that societies and economies are so
"complex and interrelated" that jurists need to draw upon the universe of
common law and statutory codifications to administer justice effectively.' 6
As a result, in modem America the common law does not operate in a
vacuum, but rather exists within a dynamic and interactive democracy that
informs, guides, and, at times, constrains its creativity.
When there are legislative and regulatory policies that define and
deal with an issue, those policies must be considered before determining
who, if anyone, is responsible for creating and, ultimately, for abating a
public nuisance in the owner's premises.17  Such a decision is
fundamentally one of public policy, and in the judicial sphere, it can only
be explained if it can be plausibly derived from policies that originate
outside the courtroom. As Justice Linde explained in his critical article:
"[T]he explanation must identify a public source of policy outside the
court itself, if the decision is to be judicial rather than legislative. A court
may determine some facts as well or better than legislators, but it cannot
derive public policy from a recital of facts."' 8 According to Justice Linde:
Style shapes how a court functions as well as how it is
perceived. The decisive difference, to repeat, is that
legislation is legitimately political and judging is not.
Unless a court can attribute public policy to a politically
accountable source, it must resolve novel issues of liability
16 See Von Mehren supra note 6, at 670 ("The experience of the twentieth century makes
clear that, as societies and economies become increasingly complex and interrelated,
legal orders need to draw on both the civil law and the common law traditions in thinking
about law and its administration.... The twenty-first century will doubtless witness a
continuation of this tendency."); see also Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down:
James Coolidge Carter and the Anticlassical Jurisprudence ofAnticodification, 19 YALE
J. L. & HUMAN. 149, 163 (2007) (Modem civil law theorists "have assumed an
increasingly flexible attitude toward traditional civil law principles .... .").
17 See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 614 (Cal. 1997) (discussing
legislative efforts to address gang activity); State v. Lead Indus. Assoc., Inc., 951 A.2d
428, 438-39 (R.I. 2008) (discussing the legislative response to childhood lead poisoning);
In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d 484, 491-94 (N.J. 2007) (reviewing legislative
efforts to address childhood lead poisoning).
18 Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: "Public Policy" Without Public Politics?, 28 VAL.
U. L. REv. 821, 852 (1994).
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within a matrix of statutes and tort principles without
claiming public policy for its own decision. Only this
preserves the distinction between the adjudicative and the
legislative function.' 9
Consistent with this observation, common law courts must fully
and fairly consider the complete "matrix" of the jurisdiction's statutes,
regulations, and common law principles before rendering their judgments.
In such a complex and interactive environment, courts cannot
appropriately rest their decisions solely on common law grounds. Courts
are not free to disregard legislative choices and create their own common
law remedies merely because the legislature does not expressly forbid
public nuisance liability in a particular context.
Using this perspective, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declined
to engage in common law creativity in its public nuisance decision
regarding lead paint. 20  The court rejected the notion that the state's
legislature, which had enacted a comprehensive scheme to address
environmental lead hazards, intended to permit "plaintiffs to supplant an
ordinary product liability claim with a separate [public-nuisance] cause of
action as to which there [were] apparently no bounds." 21 The court
recognized that it was "only in light of [the existing] statutory framework
that the arguments of the parties concerning the viability of a cause of
action sounding in public nuisance [could] be evaluated." 22  After
reviewing the existing statutory framework, the court concluded that the
New Jersey Legislature, unlike the plaintiffs, had used the term "public
nuisance" in a manner consistent with the term's historical
underpinnings,23 and "maintain[ed] a focus on the owner of premises as
the actor responsible for the public nuisance itself."24 Since the products
containing lead were only dangerous when they deteriorated after the
property owners failed to maintain their premises, the manufacturers of
lead paint products were not responsible for creating a public nuisance. In
" Id. at 855.20 See In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d at 505.
21 id
22 Id. at 494.
23 Id. at 505.
24 Id. at 500.
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another landmark case involving the same parties, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion. 25
Although similar lead paint litigation is pending in California,26
that state's legal history is markedly hostile to common law innovation in
the public nuisance arena. While the state maintains its original "general"
public nuisance statute, the California Supreme Court plainly disfavors
using that measure as a "catch all" basis for increasingly inventive claims.
Noting the amorphous, vague, and uncertain nature of the term
"nuisance," the court noted in People v. Lim that "it is a proper function of
the legislature to define those breaches of public policy which are to be
considered public nuisances within the control of equity" because what
society deems to be a nuisance may change over time.2 7 Therefore, the
court concluded that "[iln a field where the meaning of terms is so vague
and uncertain it is a proper function of the legislature to define those
breaches of public policy which are to be considered public nuisances
within the control of equity." 28 This is particularly true where the activity
can be remedied by applying criminal law unless the legislature
25 State v. Lead Indus. Assoc., Inc., 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008). For a complete history of
the litigation that resulted in the landmark Rhode Island decision, see Faulk & Gray,
Alchemy in the Courtroom?, supra note 2, at 981-1005, and Thomas Bender, Richard
Faulk & John Gray, The Mouse Roars! Rhode Island High Court Rejects Expansion of
Public Nuisance, Washington Legal Foundation (July 2008), available at
http://works.bepress.con/richard faulk/15.
26 See Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(remanding case after initial dismissal on the pleadings). Later in the same proceeding,
the California Supreme Court held that public entities were not barred from employing
private contingent fee counsel so long as the retainer agreement listed matters the private
counsel must present to government attorneys for review. See County of Santa Clara v.
Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010),
27 People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 475 (Cal. 1945). In Lim, the prosecutor asked the court
to enjoin the defendant's gambling operations and alleged that the court was empowered
to look outside of California's nuisance statutes to the common law for its jurisdiction,
where gambling was historically considered a public nuisance because it encouraged
"idle and dissolute habits". Id. at 473-74.
2 Id. at 476 ("Activity which in one period constitutes a public nuisance, such as the sale
of liquor or the holding of prize fights, might not be objectionable in another."); see also
Schur v. City of Santa Monica, 300 P.2d 831, 835 (Cal. 1956) ("[U]nless the conduct
complained of constitutes a nuisance as declared by the Legislature, equity will not enjoin
it even if it constitutes a crime .... ).
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specifically provides for an equitable remedy. 2 9 The principles espoused
in Lim are not antiquated or outdated. Indeed, they were affirmed by the
California Supreme Court in the last major public nuisance opinion it
issued in 1997,30 where the court expressly recognized the statutory
supremacy that has permeated California jurisprudence since it was
admitted to the Union in 1850.31
Under these authorities, once the legislature decides the condition
or activity is a nuisance, a court cannot usurp the legislative power by
determining that a violation is insignificant. 32 Instead, courts are bound to
only determine "whether a statutory violation in fact exists, and whether
the statute is constitutionally valid." They may not expand the scope of
the tort beyond the limits prescribed by the statute, and they are not
permitted to decide for themselves that a condition outside the statute's
intent constitutes a public nuisance. 34 When the legislative and executive
branches act to codify or modify common law rules by defining
expectations, the judiciary cannot ignore the impact of these statutes and
regulations merely because the plaintiffs cause of action originated at
common law.
Even the absence of statutes in a varticular area, however, does not
necessarily condone judicial adventures. 5 As the Rhode Island Supreme
Court recently cautioned:
29 Lim, 118 P.2d at 476. The court stated that it is not impermissible to enjoin criminal
activity when a clear case is present. But it was concerned about bypassing a criminal
trial, thereby depriving the defendant of the protection of the higher standard of proof and
leaving open the possibility that the defendant remain criminally liable for the same
activity. Id. at 476-77.
30 See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 606 (Cal. 1997) ("This lawmaking
supremacy serves as a brake on any tendency in the courts to enjoin conduct and punish it
with the contempt power under a standardless notion of what constitutes a 'public
nuisance."'); see also People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 550 P.2d 600,
613 (Cal. 1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
31 See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 606 (discussing the role of the legislature to "declare a given
act or condition a public nuisance" and the judiciary's need to defer to the legislature's
supremacy to declare the law).
32 City of Bakersfield v. Miller, 410 P.2d 393, 397-98 (Cal. 1966).
3 Id. at 398.
34 Lim, 118 P.2d at 476.
3s See Kalian v. People Acting Through Cmty. Effort, Inc., 408 A.2d 608, 609 (R.I.
1979) (construing statutory silence on the existence of a claim as deliberate exclusion of
9
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., VOL. 18, No. 1
It is not for this Court to assume a legislative function when
the General Assembly chooses to remain silent . . .. To do
otherwise, even if based on sound policy and the best of
intentions, would be to substitute our will for that of a body
democratically elected by the citizens of this state and to
overplay our proper role in the theater of Rhode Island
government. 36
Instead of viewing legislative silence as a "liberating" factor, courts must
evaluate claims within the context of priorities previously declared by the
people's elected representatives, consider the extent to which those
policies would be impacted by its decision, and then make a "principled
response" by deciding whether the requested remedy is truly within the
competence of the judiciary. 37
III. RELATIONSHIP TO THE "POLITICAL QUESTION" DOCTRINE
This concept is remarkably similar to portions of the political
question doctrine declared by the United States Supreme Court in Baker v.
Carr3 8 and its progeny, 39 where the Court held that courts should not
the claim); see also United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) ("Congress' care in formulating . .. a carefully crafted and detailed
enforcement scheme [was] strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize
other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.") (internal quotations
omitted) (citing Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209
(2002)).
36 DeSantis v. Prelle, 891 A.2d 873, 881 (R.I. 2006) (declining to extend statute-of-
limitations period by judicial rule when General Assembly had opportunity to change
period but refrained); see also Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 596 (R.I. 1998) ("[T]he
function of adjusting remedies to rights is a legislative responsibility rather than a judicial
task ... .") (citing Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 107 (R.I. 1909)).
3 See Harvey S. Perlman, Thoughts on the Role ofLegislation in Tort Cases, 36
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 813, 859 (2000) ("If a statute was enacted to protect a class of
persons from a specified risk, courts should not assume from legislative silence that the
legislature meant to reject private liability any more than courts should imply a legislative
intent to create liability. Such a protective statute calls for formulation of a principled
response, taking into account the respective roles and competencies of the court and the
legislature.").
38 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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entertain disputes when they lack "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it."40 As Justice Scalia stated for the plurality in
Vieth v. Jubelirer, "[o]ne of the most obvious limitations imposed by that
requirement is that judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule.
Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical,
and ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and
based upon reasoned distinctions." 41 The crux of the political question
inquiry "is thus not whether the case is unmanageable in the sense of
being large, complicated, or otherwise difficult to tackle from a logistical
standpoint. Rather, courts must ask whether they have the legal tools to
reach a ruling that is 'principled, rational, and based upon reasoned
distinctions." 2
There is plainly an overlap between these jurisprudential
principles, and each should inform courts when advocates invite creative
excursions. In either context, respect for the legislative and executive
spheres is critical. In public nuisance cases based on global climate
change, where no standards presently exist to measure responsibility,
political question arguments require a com arative evaluation of the
resources needed to craft appropriate rules. In other "complex and
dynamic" issues, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that, as
an institution, "the [legislature] is far better equipped than the judiciary to
'amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing upon" complex and
dynamic issues.44 A sampling of decisions from various state courts yields
similar appraisals.45
3 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
40 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. This requirement is the second of several tests listed in Baker
v. Carr, and is one of the most critical. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 ("These tests are
robably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty.").
" Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278.
42 id.
43 "Political question" considerations are primary concerns in the pending public nuisance
cases involving global climate change. See generally Faulk & Gray, supra note 2.
4 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 665-666 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., plurality) (citing Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 331 n.12 (1985)).
45 See, e.g., Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 968 (R.I. 1995) (declining to judicially
create tort liability for social hosts: "The imposition of liability . . . has such serious
implications that any action taken should be taken by the Legislature after careful
11
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Unlike courts, the legislative and executive branches can consider
all pertinent issues in their entirety, rather than being limited to the issues
raised by the parties involved in litigation. As a result, their "policy
choices are likely to strike a fairer and more effective balance between
competing interests [because] they are based on a broad perspective and
ample information.A 6  Moreover, in contrast to courts, which lose
jurisdiction upon rendition of final judgment, political branches have
"evergreen" opportunities to revisit statutes and rules to create better
tailored provisions.47
Political branches are also better equipped to deal with broad
issues because they represent a quorum of the people, unlike trial and
appellate courts. While the "process of enacting a statute" is "perhaps not
always perfect, [it] includes deliberation and an opportunity for
compromise and amendment and usually committee studies and
hearing."48 Before any law is enacted, it must garner the support of a
majority of the people through their elected representatives. Once
enacted, the legislation is subject to a gubernatorial veto and must
judicially pass any constitutional or interpretational challenges, if
challenged. These are the built-in "checks and balances" that make our
system of government work so effectively. When courts bypass these
political safeguards to implement their own common law solutions, the
investigation, scrutiny, and debate. It is abundantly clear that greater legislative
resources and the opportunity for broad public input would more readily enable the
Legislature to fashion an appropriate remedy to deal with the scope and severity of this
problem."); see also City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440
(2002); Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 812-13 (Mo. 1959) (en banc) ("Obviously,
the general assembly is not only better equipped than this court to investigate and develop
the facts pertinent to a determination of this phase of public policy but also has greater
authority to deal with the particular problem and at the same time the related ones.").
46 See Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis, 32 CoNN. L. REv 1247, 1271 (2000).
47 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Breyer, J. concurring); see also
Bandoni v. State, 715 A.2d 580, 585 (R.I. 1998) ("In the event the Legislature should
choose to [modify the statute], there is no question that it has the capacity to do so at any
time. But it is not the function of this Court to act as a super legislative body and rewrite
or amend statutes already enacted by the General Assembly.") (internal citations
omitted).
48 Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 645 (8th Cir. 1995).
12
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judiciary - the least political branch of government - declares policy
unilaterally and the will of the people is expressed not through their
elected representatives, but through a plebiscite of jurors and a hierarchy
of judges. Juries play an enormously important role in our system of
government, but they are not a substitute for decision-making by
democratically-elected representatives.
In public nuisance contexts, such considerations should predictably
result in judicial deference - not "common law" policy-making. Such
questioning will typically expose "the limits within which courts, lacking
the tools of regulation and inspection, of taxation and subsidies, and of
direct social services, can tackle large-scale problems of health care for
injured persons, of income replacement, of safe housing and products and
medical practices, of insurance, of employment, and of economic
",49efficiency....
In public nuisance cases involving global climate change, for
example, the primacy of political solutions is compelled by the universal
scope of the controversies,o the depth of the inquiries needed to develop
fair standards for their resolution, the comparative resources available to
the judiciary and the political branches, and the extreme difficulty - if not
impossibility - of fair adjudication. Indeed, as Professor Tribe recently
wrote, "[W]hatever one's position in the ... debate over the extent or ...
reality of anthropogenic climate change, one thing is clear: legislators,
armed with the best economic and scientific analysis, and with the
capability of binding or at least strongly incentivizing, all involved parties,
are the only ones constitutionally entitled to fight that battle."
49 See Linde, supra note 18, at 853.
50 The majority of the greenhouse gas emissions alleged to be creating this public
nuisance occur outside the United States. See KEVIN A. BAUMERT ET AL., NAVIGATING
THE NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, WORLD
RESOURCES INSTITUTE 12 (2005), available at http://pdf.wri.org/navigatingnumbers.pdf
(listing greenhouse gas emissions by country).
si See Laurence H. Tribe, et al., Too Hot for Courts to Handle: Fuel Temperatures,
Global Warming, and the Political Question Doctrine, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. CRITICAL
ISSUES SERIES, Jan. 2010, at 23, available at
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/O 1291 OTribeWP.pdf.
13
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With all due respect to the judges who decided Connecticut v.
American Electric Power,52 climate change cases are not "ordinary tort
suits" which can be litigated under an existing legal framework.53 Instead,
they frame wholly new claims by which plaintiffs seek to hold a
comparatively tiny group of defendants liable for a global phenomenon
caused universally by countless natural and anthropogenic sources. It is
not enough that courts have experience resolving public nuisance liability
and environmental damage cases.54 The judiciary has no experience
dealing with public nuisance litigation created by a global phenomenon
resulting from the release of greenhouse gases by millions, if not billions,
of sources (including natural events) worldwide - very few of which are
subject to the jurisdiction of American courts. The judiciary's past
experience provides no guidance for determining what standards and rules
should be applied to fairly and justly resolve such controversies in a
principled, rational, and reasoned manner.
Public nuisance cases, even those involving interstate issues, have
always been contained within well-defined geographic borders. They are
localized and linked to impairment of property, or to injuries resulting
from such effects.ss Significantly, all of the precedents upon which the
Second Circuit relied were within that tradition.56 Each case, and others
dealing with the same issue, concerned a localized controversy traceable
to specific actions by identifiable defendants,5 7 such as the discharge of
52 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
s See id at 330-331 (finding a public nuisance suit based on global climate change to be
"an ordinary tort suit," where there was "impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion") (quoting McMahon v.
Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1365 (11th Cir. 2007)).
54 See Laurence H. Tribe, et al., supra note 51, at 13-14 ("[T]he political question
doctrine is about more than wordplay.... [T]he Second Circuit - essentially confusing a
label with an argument - concluded that it was an 'ordinary tort suit' and therefore
justiciable.").
5 See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN.
L. REv. 741, 830-33 (2003).
56 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 326-29.
5 See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 875 (N.D. Cal.
2009) ("The common thread running through each of those cases is that they involved a
discrete number of 'polluters' that were identified as causing a specific injury to a
specific area.") (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 329).
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sewage or chemicals into waterways;5 8 emission of noxious fumes from
copper foundries that destroyed forests, orchards, and crops; 59 dumping
garbage into the ocean that fouled beaches;60 irrigation projects that
contributed to flooding; construction bridges that interfered with
navigation;62 and pollution of lakes by vessels transporting oil. 63
Although the panel decision by the Second Circuit cited authorities that
noted that nuisance actions were "the common law backbone of modem
environmental law,"6 it failed to recognize that each of those cases
involved acts that occurred within a circumscribed "zone of discharge,"
affected defined geographic locations, and encompassed situations where
the full range of defendants was either known or could be identified.65
Unlike global climate change, the alleged nuisance in each case was
entirely man-made, created over a relatively short period of time, and the
relief being sought was injunctive abatement, not monetary damages. 66
Global climate change, by contrast, is boundless and, according to
many scientists, caused by a universal and unlimited range of actors and
events that began at the start of the Industrial Revolution.6 7 Nothing in the
law of public nuisance allows plaintiffs to single out these few defendants
and hold them monetarily liable for creating a condition that spans the
58 See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee l), 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S.
296 (1921); Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri fl), 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Missouri v. Illinois
(Missouril), 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
5 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237
U.S. 474 (1915); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916).
60 New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 476 (1931).
61 North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 371 (1923).
62 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 526 (1851).
63 United States v. Bushey & Sons, 363 F. Supp. 110, 120-21 (D. Vt. 1973), affd without
oinion, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973).
See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 328 (2d Cir. 2009).
65 Cf Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 881 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (stressing that conduct creating the public nuisance must occur within a specified
"zone of discharge" to satisfy standing requirements).
66 See supra notes 55-63. See generally Faulk & Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom?,
supra note 2, at 949-50, 955-57.
67 See generally Richard 0. Faulk & John S. Gray, A Lawyer's Look at the Science of
Global Climate Change, 44 WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT 2 (BNA, Mar. 10, 2009)
(providing scientific references regarding the climate change phenomenon).
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globe and jointly took the entire industrialized world - in combination
with natural forces - more than 150 years to create. 8 Currently, it is
impossible to distinguish one exhalant's contribution from vehicular or
industrial emissions today, much less since the start of the Industrial
Revolution.69 Nor can the role of titanic natural forces, such as volcanism,
be calculated reliably. Moreover, no method exists to account for the
myriad confounding forces that impact the relative degree of liability
attributable to these or any defendants - such as forests and seas, which
absorb emissions. 7 0  Simply stated, the immeasurable scope of the
controversy matters. Using public nuisance to redress global climate
change far exceeds the tort's common law boundaries, - and while
venturing beyond those fences may be intellectually adventurous, there are
no standards or rules that guarantee that such explorations will result in
*71justice.
Despite the Second Circuit's decision that its ruling was consistent
with the Restatement (Second) of Torts,72 it failed to heed Dean Prosser's
stem warning in his comments to § 821B: "[I]f a defendant's conduct ...
68 See generally John S. Gray & Richard 0. Faulk, "Negligence in the Air? " Should
"Alternative Liability" Theories Apply in Lead Paint Litigation? 25 PACE ENv'T L. REV.
147 (2008) (discussing the problems associated with apportioning liability in public
nuisance cases when the plaintiffs cannot or do not sue all possible defendants, cannot
prove or trace causation as to any particular defendant, and the alleged harm was created
over a long period of time).
69 For example, Mississippi law allegedly governed the (now vacated) Fifth Circuit panel
decision. In a Mississippi civil action based on fault, however, each tortfeasor is liable
only for damages allocated to him in direct proportion to his percentage of fault. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 85-5-7 (West 2007). Fault must be assigned to absent tortfeasors who
contributed to the injury even if they are insolvent, no longer in existence, unreachable by
the court's jurisdiction or immune from liability. Id.; see also Blailock v. Hubbs, 919 So.
2d 126, 131 (Miss. 2005).
70 See generally Faulk & Gray, A Lawyer's Look at the Science of Global Climate
Change, supra note 67, at 12-14 (providing discussion and references regarding
absorption roles of forests and oceans).
71 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) ("'The judicial Power' created by
Article III, § 1, of the Constitution is not whatever judges choose to do...."). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has already warned that it has "neither the expertise nor the authority" to
evaluate the many policy judgments involved in climate change issues. Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533-34 (2007).
72 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309, 328 (2d Cir. 2009).
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does not come within one of the traditional categories of the common law
crime of public nuisance or is not prohibited by a legislative act, the court
is acting without an established and recognized standard."7 3  Dean
Prosser's wise advice, as well as history's experience with public nuisance
as a tort circumscribed by geographic limits and caused by identifiable
actors, demonstrate that it is impossible to render a judgment in climate
change cases that is "principled, rational, and based upon reasoned
distinctions."74 Consistent with Baker v. Carr, this problem does not
involve the manageability of climate change litigation. Instead, it
concerns the impossibility of creating and applying a rule of liability fairly
and rationally to reach a principled decision.
Dean Prosser's concerns were reinforced recently by one of the
reporters for the Third Restatement, Professor James A. Henderson, who
warned about the "lawlessness" of expansive tort liability. 75 According to
Professor Henderson, these new tort theories are not lawless simply
because they are non-traditional, court-made, or because the financial
stakes are high. Instead, "the lawlessness of these aggregative torts
inheres in the remarkable degree to which they combine sweeping, social-
engineering perspectives with vague, open-ended legal standards for
determining liability and measuring damages." 76  Such paths lead
inevitably to limitless and universal liability. If the court allows such
controversies to proceed, it will be "empower[ing] judges and [juries] to
exercise discretionary regulatory power at the macro-economic level ...
that even the most aggressive administrative agencies could never hope to
possess. In exercising these extraordinary regulatory powers via tort
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e. (1979). Because of its
vagueness and mutability outside of defined boundaries, public nuisance has even been
characterized as a "chameleon word." J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance: A Critical
Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 55, 56 (1989).
74 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278.
" See James A. Henderson, Jr., The Lawlessness ofAggregative Torts, 34 HOFsTRA L.
REv. 329, 330 (2005). Despite Professor Henderson's status and writings, neither
plaintiffs nor their amici have referenced his concerns or distinguished his reasoning from
the present "aggregative" controversy.
76 Id. at 338.
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litigation, courts (including juries) exceed the legitimate limits of both
their authority and their competence."77
Dean Prosser's wise advice, as well as Professor Henderson's
concerns about "lawlessness," are substantiated by the history of public
nuisance - a history in which where courts have refused to expand liability
because of concerns over "standardless" liability. In the early 20
century, litigants argued that public nuisance should be expanded to
address activities that were not criminal and which did not implicate
property rights or enjoyment.78 Proponents of this expansion argued that
the "end justified the means" by highlighting the tort's remarkable
effectiveness and claiming "that [otherwise] there is no adequate remedy
provided at law."79
Legal commentators and authorities, however, objected when
public authorities sought to use public nuisance to address broad societal
problems such as over-reaching monopolies, restraint of trade activities,
prevention of criminal acts, and labor controversies such as strikes.8 0
They warned that this "solution" was planting the seeds of abuse that
would ultimately weaken the judicial system. ' Finally, when public
nuisance was used as a precursor to CERCLA 82 to address environmental
contamination in the Love Canal controversy, a decade of nuisance
77 Id. Although the Fifth Circuit in Comer stressed that tort cases rarely involve political
questions, aggregative torts, such as public nuisance, raise unique "lawlessness" concerns
that transcend routine tort cases and cross the political question threshold. See Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 873-74 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Henderson, supra note
75, at 338-39.
78 See People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 475 (Cal. 1941) (noting that courts justified "public
nuisance" abatement because "public and social interests, as well as the rights of
property, are entitled to the protection of equity.").
'
9 See Edwin S. Mack, Revival of Criminal Equity 16 HARv. L. REv. 389, 400-03 (1903).
These same arguments are again resurfacing as governmental authorities employ public
nuisance litigation to address complex problems such urban violence and public health
issues. See also Faulk & Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom?, supra note 2, at 974-75.
80 Mack noted that the expanding boundaries of public nuisance law making courts of
equity of that time period careless of their traditional jurisdictional limits. Mack, supra
note 79, at 397.
8 Id. at 400-03.
82 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, & Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (2006).
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litigation failed to produce a solution.83  Thereafter, arguments urging
expansion were increasingly rejected, most notably in California, where
the state's supreme court ultimately deferred to the legislature's "statutory
supremacy" to define and set standards for determining liability.
Significantly, the court did so because judicial creativity would otherwise
result in "standardless" liability.85
There is plainly an overlap between this jurisprudential principle
and the political question doctrine. Although these concepts are
inextricably linked, their conjunction has been inexplicably overlooked.
Just as courts have traditionally resisted invitations to expand public
nuisance liability in the absence of clear boundaries and guiding
principles, courts also resist deciding political question controversies
where they cannot devise definitive standards and rules for their
adjudication. Each principle informs courts when advocates invite
creative excursions, and in both contexts, respect for the legislative and
executive spheres, and the constitutional limits on judicial power is
critical. History's experience with public nuisance as a tort traditionally
circumscribed by geographic limits and caused by identifiable actors,
coupled with the pronounced concerns of wise legal scholars and courts
regarding the dangers of entertaining controversies without guiding
adjudicative principles, demonstrates the present impossibility of
rendering judgments in climate change cases that are "principled, rational,
and based upon reasoned distinctions."86
8 See ECKARDT C. BECK, EPA, THE LOVE CANAL TRAGEDY, EPA JOURNAL (Jan. 1979),
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01 .htm ("no secure mechanisms
[were] in effect for determining such liability."). See generally Charles H. Mollenberg,
Jr., No Gap Left: Getting Public Nuisance Out ofEnvironmental Regulation and Public
Policy, 7 EXPERT EVIDENCE REPORT. (BNA) 474, 475-76 (Sept. 24, 2007).
8 See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 606 (Cal. 1997) ("This lawmaking
supremacy serves as a brake on any tendency in the courts to enjoin conduct and punish it
with the contempt power under a standardless notion of what constitutes a 'public
nuisance."').
85 Id.; see also People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (Cal. 1941) ("In a field where the
meaning of terms is so vague and uncertain it is a proper function of the legislature to
define those breaches of public policy which are to be considered public nuisances within
the control of equity.").
86 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004).
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Contrary to the Second Circuit's concerns, the issue is not whether
federal common law regarding public nuisance has been "displaced" by
87Congress or the EPA. Legislative and regulatory silence is not
dispositive of whether courts are competent to decide climate change
controversies. Indeed, there has been "a longstanding resistance, as a
matter of law, to the idea that legislative inaction or silence, filtered
through a judicial stethoscope, can be made to sound out changes in the
law's lyrics - altering the prevailing patterns of rights, powers, or
privileges that collectively constitute the message of our laws."88
Moreover, the Supreme Court has condemned reliance on congressional
silence as "a poor beacon to follow."89 More pointedly - and remarkably
similar to the concerns of Dean Prosser and Professor Henderson - Justice
Frankfurter warned that "we walk on quicksand when we try to find in the
absence of . .. legislation a controlling legal principle." 90
The absence of action by the political branches does not empower
common law adventures. This is especially true in public nuisance cases
based upon global climate change, where there are no "controlling legal
principles" to frame the controversy, fully investigate the issues,
adjudicate liability, or allocate responsibility. In such cases, courts must
decide whether they have the resources to investigate and devise a proper
remedy, and whether they are capable of creating definitive standards and
rules to resolve the controversies fairly. This question goes to the very
heart of the political question doctrine.91 Unless this inquiry is answered
87 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309, 374-381 (discussing whether the
federal common law remedy of public nuisance must be applied by the courts unless
"displaced" by Congressional or regulatory measures).
8 Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of
Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 516 (1982) (quoting Thomas
Reed Powell, The Still Small Voice of the Commerce Clause, in 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON
CONSTrTUTIoNAL LAW 931, 932 (Ass'n of Am. Law Schools 1938)).
89 Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969); see also Cleveland v. United States, 329
U.S. 14, 22 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (noting that "[t]here [are] vast differences
between legislating by doing nothing and legislating by positive enactment . . .
90 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940) (emphasis added).
91 The Supreme Court clearly recognizes that such scenarios exist. See Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) ("Sometimes, however, the law is that the judicial
department has no business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness - because the question
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correctly, the judiciary, the parties, and the public interest will be
sacrificed to the shifting sands of "standardless" liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
If, as Justice Holmes counsels, the development of the common
law should be "molar and molecular," 92 the wholesale transmutation of
public nuisance concepts to authorize, for example, a massive judicially-
created environmental bureaucracy - answerable only to a single judge -
requires more rumination and digestion than the judiciary alone can
prudently provide. Enthusiasts who advocate public nuisance litigation as
a universal panacea should pay careful attention to the rumination
analogy. Despite the tort's ravenous reputation as a potential "monster"
capable of devouring time-honored legal precedents in a single gulp, that
appetite is constrained by the common law's tendencies to move in a
"molar and molecular" fashion - to chew thoroughly - and then to
swallow, if at all, only small bits at a time.
Faced with allegations of planetary liability, wise jurists may
decide that they lack the resources and tools to comprehensively
investigate, thoroughly evaluate, and fairly resolve public nuisance claims
based upon global climate change. After considering their unique role in
our tripartite system of government, judges may decide that complex
environmental bureaucracies can only be reliably developed and justly
administered outside their limited realm. They may conclude that judicial
intrusion into such matters usurps the legislature's and the executive's
prerogatives, especially when they are urged to base sweeping liability
determinations on narrow, case by case standards limited by a record
generated solely by litigants, and by budgets constrained by judicial
is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights.")
(emphasis added).
92 See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I
recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions."); see also CARDOZO,
supra note 1, at 113 (stating that courts make law only within the "gaps" and "open
spaces of the law"). Neither Holmes nor Cardozo can be cited to support deliberate,
large-scale reversals of doctrine in the name of public policy.
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appropriations. Under such circumstances, the limits of judicial
competency suggest that forbearance, rather than adventure, may be the
most "principled response."
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